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Chapter J6
Women as Widows Under a Reformed
Social Security System
Karen C. Holden
The U.S. social security system has two missions: to insure workers and their
immediate families against the loss of income due to workers' disability or
retirement, and to provide those benefits in a way that favors workers and
families who are less likely to be otherwise insured. The current debate over
the structure ofsocial security is in large part a discussion over the attributes
of individuals and families to whom redistributive benefits are paid, and the
current financial importance and social value of these benefits. Women,
more often than men, are the beneficiaries of the redistributive compo-
nents-as recipients of spouse and survivor benefits and of the higher re-
placement of covered earnings for low-wage workers-so the debate is
about the value to women and their families of retaining these redistributive
benefits.
This chapter focuses on the economic and social rationale for and value
of social security survivor benefits. We first describe the historical reasoning
for the provision of survivor benefits, and for their payment without actu-
arial reduction in the married worker's benefits prior to death but subject to
an implicit means test. Understanding the motivation for the structure of
survivor benefits is the first step in debating whether they remain econom-
ically and socially relevant today. We next review recent findings about the
economic consequences of widowhood during the early 1990s. This discus-
sion is followed by discussion of the treatment of widows under the two
proposals of the recent Advisory Council on Social Security that include
individual accounts. Whether a widow's economic status improves under
reform proposals that would provide greater individual discretion over the
payment of survivor benefits will depend, in part, on whether the widow
shares in the individual accounts of her deceased husband, in the form of
either a joint-and-survivor annuity elected at the husband's retirement or
the inheritance of undistributed accumulations at his death. A review of
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results from an analysis of predictors of the joint-and-survivor selection,
presented in the final section, suggests the role of regulatory policies gov-
erning the bequeathing of individual accounts to surviving spouses. l
A Brief History of Social Security Survivor Benefits
The social security system is sometimes described as based on a now-
outmoded" traditional" view of the family, though in fact the framers of the
social security system were quite sophisticated. Benefit proposals did take
account of the greater prevalence of one-earner couples at that time, but
women were not expected to remain permanently out of the work force. The
1937-38 Advisory Council on Social Security recommended benefits for
younger widows only if they were caring for their deceased spouses' minor
children on the basis that "It is normal for a large majority of younger
widows without dependent children to reenter employment" (Brown 1977:
31). Benefits for older widows were argued largely on income adequacy
grounds, targeting a group of individuals in need of additional income "to
tide themselves over the period of income stoppage for which social insur-
ance benefits are payable without the necessity of 'recourse to public assistance"
(Burns 1949: 413, emphasis added).
Upon that Advisory Council's recommendation, the 1939 Social Security
Amendments provided for a supplemental benefit to aged wives and widows
(if 65 and older), but it also imposed a "dual entitlement" provision. This
mandated a dollar-for-dollar reduction in spouse and survivor benefits if the
wife or widow received her own retired-worker benefits.2 For this reason, it is
more accurate to characterize the original social security model as one that
overlaid a strict earnings-related insurance system offering women and men
identical retired-worker benefits with an income-transfer system whose pro-
visions were akin to means testing in other income-transfer programs. Tar-
geting supplemental benefits to wives and widows was considered to be
consistent with the adequacy goals of the social security system during the
early years of the program, at a time when retired-worker benefits were low
and most married women would be unlikely to contribute much earnings-
based retirement income toward the consumption needs of the married
household, or toward their own consumption needs when their husbands
died. At the same time, the adequacy goals motivating these benefits also
dictated reduced benefits for married women and survivors when other
sources ofincome were available - principally their own retired-worker ben-
efits accompanied, perhaps, by pension income connected to longer market
careers.
Dramatic increases in labor market attachment by women during the
second halfof the 20th century, along with changes in family structure, have
made the dual entitlement provision an increasingly apparent factor in
determining the benefits of married women. In 1960, 57 percent offemale
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social security beneficiaries were eligible for benefits solely as a spouse or
survivor, but by 1995 this was true for only 37 percent of female beneficia-
ries. Conversely, in 1960, only 9 percent of all female retired-worker benefi-
ciaries were dually entitled - that is, eligible for both a retired-worker bene-
fit and a spouse or survivor benefit higher than their own retired-worker
benefits; by 1995, 43 percent of all retired-worker beneficiaries were dually
entitled (Social Security Administration 1997).3 These changes would be
expected in a population in which paid labor market activity is an increas-
ingly important component of women's lives. At the same time, women's
lengthening work careers have led to a rise in the percentage of female
social security beneficiaries who experience (and are aware of) small or no
marginal gains in their social security benefits with longer years of covered
employment. Every proposal for reform - including those of the recent
Social Security Advisory Council- embodies a View about the value of these
benefits to individuals and families.
The Continuing Vulnerability of Widows
As described, during the 1930s, the relatively low incomes of elderly couples
and widows motivated the provision of spouse and survivor benefits (paid
initially only to women). Today, the poverty rate for families headed by a
retired worker now lies below rates for all working-age families with a male
present, a gain attributable to increases in the real wages of workers and to
improvements in the social security benefit formula. Despite improvements
in the income levels of older households over the past several decades,
including those of women living alone, incomes ofwidowed women remain
substantially below those of married households, even when household in-
comes are adjusted for differences in consumption needs.
Research using data from the 1970s and early 1980s attempts to separate
the contribution to the relatively low income of widows of widowhood itself
from the relatively low income of about-ta-be widowed households (Bound
et al. 1991; Burkhauser, Holden, and Feaster 1988; Hurd and Wise 1989).
The picture emerging from these studies is that while a share of the lower
average income of widows and intact couples, widowhood itself had a large,
negative impact on the economic wellbeing of women widowed during
those decades. Since then, women's labor-force participation rates have con-
tinued to rise, the life insurance and pension industries have expanded
survivor policy options, and pension legislation has been passed that aimed
to increase the share of a couple's resources paid to a widow after her
husband's death (e.g., the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act
and the 1984 Retirement Equity Act). These forces might be expected to
reduce the impact ofwidowhood on women more recently widowed.
A recent study by Holden and Zick (1997) shows that even for women
widowed during the 1990s, widowhood continued to be accompanied by a
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large and abrupt decline in income. Figure 1 shows the pattern of average
monthly income-to-needs ratios of women whose widowhood was observed
over the 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). These "eventually widowed couples" are defined as
women who at the first SIPP interview were 40 or older, married with hus-
bands present, and whose husbands died at some point during the 32-
month SIPP panel, after which the widows were observed for at least one
interview as a widow.4 Figure 1 also shows average monthly income-to-needs
ratios for a comparison group of "intact couples" in which the wife was also
40 and older at the first interview but who remained married through-
out the 32-month SIPP panel. This comparison group is presented as an
estimate of the income changes that might otherwise have been observed
among the eventually widowed couples but for their having been widowed.
In this way it is possible to separate the contribution to the relatively low
income of widows of pre-widowhood differences in income levels (which
mayor may not be attributed to pending widowhood itself), changes in real
income upon widowhood that may be attributable to broader economic
forces (e.g., to high rates of inflation), and the change that is attributable to
widowhood itself. Since intact couples in the SIPP sample are on average
younger than eventually widowed couples, the age distribution of the intact-
couple group are "matched" to that of the eventually widowed couples. This
forced comparability in age structure means that differences in income and
income change between the two groups of women are net of differences in
age structure.5
In Figure 1 the data for each eventually widowed woman are arrayed
around the month ofwidowhood, which may occur at different SIPP months
for the widows in the sample.6 A month of "widowhood" is randomly as-
signed to intact-couples using an approach suggested by Zick and Smith
(1991). While the continuously married couples are in fact never widowed,
arraying their monthly incomes around an assigned widowhood month pro-
vides a comparison over the same extended time period.
The story told in Figure 1 is strikingly similar to the findings of the studies
using earlier years' data. Prior to widowhood, eventually widowed house-
holds have lower incomes than do their continuously married counterparts.
The eventual widows' average income-to-needs (using the standard U.S.
Census Bureau needs calculations) was 3.41 in the two months preceding
widowhood, but this ratio dropped to 2.38 immediately after the husbands'
deaths. While the average pre-widowhood income-to-needs ratio ofeventual
widows is only 10 percent below that ofcontinuously married couples, in the
post-widowhood months their monthly income-to-needs falls to and stabi-
lizes at roughly 70 percent of that of the comparison couples. Compared to
women widowed in the 1984 SIPP, the 1990s widows are only slightly better
off both before and after widowhood - women widowed in the 1984 panel
had income-to-needs ratios of 3.1 in the pre-widowhood months, declining
6
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Figure 1. Income-to-needs ratios for always-married women and eventual widows. Source: Author's calculations.
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to 2.0 for the two months after widowhood (Holden 1990). In sum, while
widows' lower economic status as compared to married couples appears to
be explained in part by pre-widowhood income differences, a decline by
almost one-third in income-to-needs occurs at the time of the husband's
death.?
Why women on average suffer a large decline in income upon their hus-
bands' deaths is not fully understood. The analysis of the predictors of
income-to-needs and of income changes by Holden and Zick (1997) finds
that while these two groups of couples are remarkably alike in the pre-
widowhood months on many demographic dimensions, there are marked
differences in the sources of income before and after the husband's death.
Husbands about to die are more likely to be drawing on social security and
pension benefits and less likely to have labor income than are their married
counterparts. This is not surprising, given the lower labor market involve-
ment among the about-to-die husbands.
It is also clear from the SIPP analysis of widowhood that the receipt of a
pension both is associated with higher pre-widowhood income and lessens
the economic shock of the widowhood event itself. Among the women who
were widowed in the SIPP panels, those who received a pension as a widow
both had higher pre-widowhood income-to-needs ratios than those who did
not (4.13 vs. 3.03) and had a significantly smaller decline in that ratio (11 %
vs. 38%). Compared to the 74 percent of the men in eventually widowed
couples who were receiving pensions prior to their deaths, only 45 percent of
the widows received a pension. The loss of this pension explains an impor-
tant part of the decline in income among widows. It is clear that, while not all
husbands are eligible for a pension before they die, the receipt of pension
following the husbands' death cushions the fall in income upon widowhood.
Ironically, the expansion in pension coverage, which has increased the pro-
portion of men who receive a pension, has increased the importance of
pensions as an explanation of income declines upon widowhood.
Social Security Reform Proposals
Two of the three reform plans described in Chapter 1 by the Advisory
Council on Social Security have a defined-contribution layer on top of
a basic defined-benefit plan.8 The Personal Savings Account (PSA) plan
would add a mandated defined-contribution individual account (financed
by a 1.6 percent increase in the payroll tax rate) to a defined-benefit plan
whose benefits would be somewhat less generous than the current system.9
The Individual Account plan proposes that the major share of social security
benefits be derived from a fully funded, privately held individual account
that would be a second tier of a system that also provided a flat retirement
benefit tied to a number of years covered. Under both proposals, the surviv-
ing spouse would be eligible for a benefit that is no less than 75 percent of
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the combined benefits received by the couple from the defined-benefit
component of the plan. Under the PSA plan, while the worker is alive, the
spouse would be eligible for a spouse's benefit equal to one-third of the
other spouse's Primary Insurance Amount (before any early-retirement re-
duction). When both spouses in a couple claim benefits at the normal
retirement age, the 75 percent survivor benefit would leave the surviving
spouse in a one-earner couple with a benefit equal to that of the deceased
worker's and the surviving spouse ofa two-worker, equal-earner couple with
a benefit equal to 150 percent of the (equal) individual benefit (i.e., .75*
200%). The 75 percent survivor benefit across all couples compares to the
current system in which survivor benefits range from two-thirds to 50 per-
cent of the couples' combined pre-widowhood beneficlo
Under the Individual Account alternative the non-working spouse of a
one-earner couple would be eligible for a benefit equal to 50 percent of the
flat benefit. Consequently, the 75 percent survivor benefit for a widow would
amount to between 112.5 percent of the flat benefit for a one-earner couple
(75% of 1.50 of the flat benefit) to 150 percent of the one-person single flat
benefit for a two-worker equal-earner couple. While this percentage is
higher than the current 100 percent of deceased-worker benefit for sur-
vivors first claiming benefits at or after the normal retirement age, it is a
percentage of a much lower proposed flat benefit-$41O per month (in
1996 dollars) for a single earner. The resulting survivor benefit is between
$461 and $615 and is lower than the average benefit award of $781 paid in
1995 to nondisabled widows 65 and older (Social Security Administration,
1996),u Under both the Individual Account and the PSA plans, widows
would be assured only the survivor benefits based on the lower, basic bene-
fits. Whether, as widows, wives would share in the projected higher social
security benefits paid to workers from both tiers, would depend on their
sharing as wives and widows in their husbands' individual accounts. As
widows they would not be assured a share unless an explicit bequest was
made or a survivor annuity chosen by their husbands prior to death. In the
next section of this chapter we present evidence on the probability of hus-
bands' making this choice and the policy implications of that evidence.
Joint-and-Survivor Benefits
The married individual who applies for social security retired-worker bene-
fits now has no choice as to whether survivor benefits will be paid to a surviv-
ing spouse or a former spouse nor as to the amount paid. Divorced indi-
viduals automatically are entitled to a survivor benefit based on their former
spouse's covered earnings. Individual accounts introduce choice into the
payment of survivor benefits, unless the option to choose against a joint-
and-survivor option is restricted by accompanying federal regulation. The
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PSA plan would require annuitization but allow a married worker to choose
a single-life benefit (a benefit that ceases upon the worker's death) or
ajoint-and-survivor benefit (a benefit that continued to be paid to the des-
ignated survivor). The proposed regulation of annuitized accounts in the
PSA roughly mirrors federal regulation now governing private employer-
provided pensions (Kushner and Domone 1995). The Individual Account
alternative would not require annuitization, nor did proponents of this plan
propose regulations on the type of annuity selected when the accounts are
annuitized.
Critical to how widows will fare under the two individual-accounts pro-
posals is whether workers will choose to share these pension assets across the
years when only one of them may be alive. As wives' labor force participation,
earnings, and pension coverage increase, it is not known how husbands may
consider these changes in making their choice about annuity type.
Pension Legislation
In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) estab-
lished minimum fiduciary, coverage, and vesting requirements governing
qualified private pension plans. ERISA (as amended) applies only to an
"employee benefit plan ... established or maintained by any employer ...
[except that it] shall not apply to ... a governmental plan" (ERISA SecA).
The "joint-and-survivor annuity requirements" of ERISA specifY that
when the primary form of plan payout is an annuity, the default payout form
to married workers must be at least a joint-and-one-half survivor annuity
which is actuarially equivalent to the single-life worker pension. That is, the
spouse of the married worker is eligible for a survivor benefit equal to at
least one-half of the benefit payable to the retired worker under this option.
Ajoint-and-survivor benefit that is actuarially equivalent to a single-life pen-
sion will pay a lower benefit during the retired worker's lifetime. ERISA
originally allowed the married worker to choose a single-life annuity, a
lump-sum distribution, or some other option instead of the default option
without notification to the spouse. The 1984 Retirement Equity Act (REA)
amended ERISA to require the spouse's notarized signature when the de-
faultjoint-and-survivor option is rejected.
This default joint-and-survivor annuity must be provided by defined-
benefit plans and by defined contribution plans unless participants do not
elect benefits in the form of an annuity and the nonforfeitable accrued
benefit is payable in full to the participant's spouse. While ERISA also regu-
lates Individual Retirement Accounts and 403(b) tax deferred annuities,
the distributions from these accounts fall outside the joint-and-survivor reg-
ulations. Likewise, ERISA rules on distributions do not apply to privately
purchased annuities from life insurance companies. In other words, ERISA
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requirements regulate the joint-and-survivor annuity selection, but workers
may opt not to take the joint-and-survivor option or may roll over pension
distributions into accounts that are not regulated.
Exploring the degree to which men who now receive a pension choose to
insure their wives through ajoint-and-survivor option provides insight into
the protection that widows may receive from their husbands' individual
accounts and into which widows would be vulnerable to the loss ofa pension
under a more privatized system. The next section examines the predictors
of the decision by married men to take ajoint-and-survivor pension.
Predictors ofJoint-and-SuNivor Annuity Selection
The data used are for married male retired workers in the New Beneficiary
Survey (NBS). The NBS surveyed a sample of individuals who first received
social security benefits during 1980-81. They and their spouses, if married,
were interviewed approximately one year later. Here we examine male
retired-worker beneficiaries who were married and reported pension re-
ceipt at the time of the 1982 survey. Respondents were asked when their
pensions were first received, from which it is possible to determine whether
their pensions began prior to or after the effective date of ERISA. In addi-
tion, pensioners were asked whether their pension would continue to their
spouse, if they died today. It is from this question that the estimate ofjoint-
and-survivor selection is derived. 12 Because the NBS sample is of men who
were already pension recipients, the analysis does not throw any light on the
consequences for widows when husbands vested in a pension die prior to
pension receipt. In addition, the pension-{)ption selection of these men was
not governed by the 1984 provisions of the Retirement Equity Act, and so
the effects of that act cannot be examined with these data. 13 We examine the
probability that the married man chose a pension that would continue to be
paid to his wife after death, as a function of explanatory variables affecting
the willingness of the couple to suffer a reduction in pension income when
both were alive, the "need" ofthe widow for the additional pension income,
and the likelihood of the husband's dying earlier than his wife.
For the total sample of married men, 62 percent had elected a pension
that would continue to be paid to the widow after the husband's death. This
is a weighted average of the 48 percent of the men whose pension benefits
began prior to 1974 who elected a joint-and-survivor pension, and the 64
percent whose benefits began in 1974 orlater who did so.
The difference in these two groups of men's election suggested an effect
of the 1974 legislation, but establishing exactly which kinds of men elect a
joint-and-survivor pension is more complex. An earlier analysis of men's
pension-{)ption selection in the pre-ERISA years (Holden and Burkhauser
1986) hypothesized that the pension-{)ption selection was shaped by eco-
nomic factors affecting both the value and the affordability ofa pension that
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continued to a widow. For a group ofmen electing a pension in the pre-1974
legislation years, the joint-and-survivor pension was more likely to be se-
lected (a) by husbands who were economically better off (implying that the
couple was better able to afford a reduction in the husband's pension while
both were alive), (b) when the wife's expected widowhood period was
longer (implying a longer survivor pension pay-out period for these cou-
pies), and (c) whose pension wealth was a higher proportion of his total
wealth (implying that he was constrained in resources that could be be-
queathed to the widow) .14 For this pre-ERISA sample, the wife's own in-
come and pension eligibility failed to have an influence on the husband's
pension-option selection, implying that the couple's decision was shaped
primarily by the costs and consequences of reducing his own pension in-
come when both spouses were alive. We replicate and extend this earlier
analysis, taking advantage of the more up-ta-date and detailed NBS data.
The results of the analysis of the survivor-option selection are presented
in Table 1. Predictors include wealth measures (total wealth of the husband,
the share of his wealth that is his pension, and the wife's own wealth), an
indicator of whether the wife is eligible for her own pension (the wealth
value of which is included in her wealth measure), an indicator of the
husband's poor health, and indicators of the difference in age between
husband and wife. We include additional measures of the timing of the
pension selection (POST-ERISA=1 if the pension began in 1974 or later), of
the husband's marital history (MARRIED BEFORE=l if the husband was
married before), and if there were children from the current marriage
(CHILDMAR=1 if there were children from the current marriage). The last
variable is included since adult children may provide support to a widowed
parent, should resources in widowhood be insufficient.
A husband with greater wealth (TWEALTH) is expected to allocate more
wealth to the period of his wife's widowhood. The greater is the share of
husband's wealth that is his pension (PWEALTH), the more important is
the selection of a joint-and-survivor pension as a means of bequeathing
wealth to the widow.15 The greater the wealth value of the wife's on pension
and social security benefits (WlDWLTH), the less dependent is her well-
being as a widow on her husband's pension selection. The wife's pension
eligibility (WlFEELIG) indicates whether eligibility for her own pension,
versus other forms of wealth, has a unique influence on the husband's
pension decision. Finally, the health and age variables are included to indi-
cate observable - to the couple - differences in the probability that the wife
will survive the husband. 16
The results using the new data are largely consistent with earlier findings
(Burkhauser and Holden 1986). The share of wealth accounted for by the
husband's pension increased the probability that a joint-and-survivor was
selected, indicating that couples who are most likely to take the joint-and-
survivor pension are those for whom cessation of pension income would
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TABLE 1. Predictors ofJoint-and-Survivor Selection (Probit Estimate)
Variables
INTERCEPT
TWEALTH
PWEALTH
WIDWLTH
WIFEELIG
HEALTH
AGEl
AGE2
AGE4
POST-ERISA
CHILDMAR
MARRIED BEFORE
WHITE
N
Coefficients
-.698***
-.001
2.270***
-1.062***
-.124*
.116*
-.252*
-.084
-.342***
.703***
.122*
-.096
.239*
2058
Source: Author's computation using data from the New Beneficiary Survey, 1982.
*Significant at .1 level; **significant at .05 level; ***significant at .01 level.
Variable definition
TWEALTH The wealth value of asset, pension, and Social Security that the husband can
consume over his lifetime.
PWEALTH Share of his pension wealth comprisingTWEALTH (%)
WIDWLTH Wealth value of widow's Social Security benefits, her own retirement pension,
and other assets owned by her over her expected widowed life.
WIFEEUG Equal 1 ifwife is eligible for a pension in her own right, zero otherwise.
HEALTH Equal 1 if husband reports anyone of three serious health conditions.
AGEl Ifhusband is 11 or more years older than wife.
AGE2 If husband is 10-4 years older than wife.
AGE3 If husband is within 3 years ofwife's age.
AGE4 Ifwife is 4 or more years older than husband.
POST-ERISA If pension was initiated after 1974
CHILDMAR Ifcouple had children from current marriage (adult or minor)
MARRIED BEFORE If husband was married before.
WHITE If husband was white
seriously reduce the wealth that continued into widowhood. Consistent with
the earlier study, couples appear to consider their own differential risk of
widowhood. The husband's own poor health (HEALTH) increases the
probability of his selecting a joint-and-survivor pension. When the wife is
substantially older than her husband (AGE4), and consequently, her ex-
pected widowhood shorter than average, the husband is less likely to take a
survivor pension. It is also the case that much older husbands (AGEl) are
less likely to choose ajoint-and-survivor pension, probably due to the large
benefit cut as compared to the single-life pension for such couples. The
positive effect ofbeing white may reflect the much longer expected lifetimes
of white women (and the greater value to them of a survivor pension) in a
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world of race-neutral pension calculations. Finally, whether a husband is in a
first marriage or subsequent marriage has no effect beyond the effect prior
marriages may have had on his current wealth. 17
Conclusion
A major policy question is why women remain vulnerable to sharp income
changes when their husbands die. The risk of poverty among widows has
diminished in part because of the greater resources that women bring into
widowhood, but widowhood is still accompanied by a large fall in income.
To the extent that social policy is designed not only to guarantee minimum
income levels, but also to reduce the likelihood of severe income changes
for all widows, this goal has not been fully achieved.
Proposals to provide a larger share of couples' combined social security
benefits to survivors, financed by lowering benefits paid to the couple,
would diminish the sharp decline in income upon widowhood (Burkhauser
and Smeeding 1994). However, reforms that would substitute an individual
account component for some share of current benefits might increase the
widow's losses, depending on the share of the husband's individual account
bequeathed to his widow. The PSA plan would require annuitization with a
joint-and-survivor option that could be rejected by the annuitant. The Indi-
vidual Account plan would not mandate annuitization or regulate the form
of the annuity.
Our empirical analysis of the joint-and-survivor selection among married
male pensioners offers insight into the characteristics of widows who might
be most vulnerable to income declines under an individual account system.
We find that smaller social security survivor benefits would increase the
probability of the husband'sjoint-and-survivor selection. We also find that as
women's pension coverage increases, the joint-and-survivor probability falls,
leaving wives more vulnerable to income declines upon widowhood. The
effect of ill health and age differences on the probability of electing a joint-
and-survivor benefit implies a rational weighing of the relative value of
that benefit. At the same time, it means that a man who dies "against the
odds" - e.g., a healthy man or a husband younger than his wife who dies
unexpectedly early - will leave a widow without the assured income protec-
tion now provided through a uniform survivor benefit.
The results suggest that reform proposals that include a m~or individual
accounts component should include discussion of the details of the regula-
tions governing the annuity options that workers may elect. It is important
to note that the Individual Account plan would leave these accounts largely
unregulated, and the PSA plan, which would require annuitization, would
allow workers to choose against a joint-and-survivor option.
Under the current social security system, survivors (including divorced
368 Widows Under a Reformed Social Security System
spouses) are eligible for a social security benefit at least as large as that of
their deceased (ex-)spouse, although that benefit may be reduced for early
acceptance, for continued earnings, or by the survivor's receipt of her own
social security retired-worker benefit. Under the individual account op-
tions, a survivor pension would be paid without regard to other income and
assets. Widows who now have their social security survivor benefits reduced
would be better offwith inherited individual accounts. However, if husbands
select against the joint-and-survivor annuity when their wives have their own
social security or employer-provided pensions, widows might be no better
off-and perhaps worse off-under a system with far smaller guaranteed
survivor benefits. Among the women widowed in the 1990, 1991, and 1992
SIPP panels, less than half as many reported pension receipt after their
husbands' death as would have been expected had all pension-recipient
husbands chosen a joint-and-survivor pension, and women who had no
pensions after their husband died experience sharper declines in income.
Other studies ofwidowhood have found that social security survivor bene-
fits are as important to the economic well-being of widows as are bene-
fits from private pension plans (Holden, Burkhauser, and Feaster 1988).
Longer work histories and greater pension coverage among women have
not eliminated the economic risk of widowhood. Our findings, using the
NBS data, also suggest that proposals to restructure the social security
system so that a greater share of the system's protection is derived from
individual accounts may pay greater attention to the consequences for
widows - still an economically vulnerable group - of allowing holders of
those accounts to choose an annuity that ceases upon the death of the
spouse. The passage of legislation making a joint-and-survivor option the
default payment in private plans was an important contributor to a substan-
tial rise in the percentage of men taking that option after 1974. Even as
these findings suggest that couples rationally weigh the relative value of
postponing potential consumption to the years when the wife alone sur-
vives, they also suggest that untimely deaths will leave widows without sur-
vivor benefit protection. For the widow whose husband chose a single-life
annuity, however rational that decision may have been, the death of the hus-
band and her loss of his pension would result in the continuation of the in-
come declines now experienced by widows.
Support for this research was provided in part by a grant from the Social
Security Administration and a training grant in the Economics of Mental
Health from the National Institute of Mental Health. Sean Nicholson and
Stuart Kipnis provided valuable assistance with the NBS and SIPP estimates,
respectively. All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper
represent the views of the author and not necessarily those of the funding
agencies.
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Notes
1. Gender neutrality in the social security system means that all issues discussed in
this chapter may apply to a surviving husband. On the other hand, continuing
differences in earnings of women and men mean that women are at much greater
risk of poverty as widows than are men as widowers, so the public policy issue is
addressed here as a widowhood issue.
2. The payment of survivor benefits initially only to women does reflect a tradi-
tional view of the family in which husbands were expected to be the primary earners.
Payment was extended to husbands in 1950, but only if pre-widowhood economic
dependency could be established. After 1975, when the dependency test for men
and not for women was ruled discriminatory by the U.S. Supreme Court, all remain-
ing sex-based differences in social security rules were eliminated.
3. This is an underestimate of women eligible for both a retired-worker and a
spouse or survivor benefit, since the Social Security Administration defines as dually
entitled only persons eligible for retired-worker benefits and a higher spouse or sur-
vivor benefit. If dual entitlement were defined as persons eligible for both a retired-
worker benefit and a subsidiary benefit, regardless of size, virtually all ever-married
women and men would be so deemed.
4. Each SIPP panel is a nationally representative sample of households whose
members are interviewed at four-month intervals over approximately a 32-month
period (U.S. Bureau of Census 1987).
5. Before weighting the intact-couple sample to achieve age comparability, each
sample was weighted by the SIPP sample weights that adjust for the specific sampling
criteria used in SIPP and panel attrition. The age weighting of the intact-couple
sample means that their data do not reflect the actual average experience of this
group, but only of this group with a reweigh ted age structure.
6. The aggregate data are arrayed over a 64-month period, even though for any
single couple we have a maximum of32 months ofdata. This is because some women
are observed for a longer period as married women and are widowed near the end of
the panel, while others are widowed early and are observed for a longer period as
widows.
7. The 0 month is the month in which the husband dies. The first month of post-
widowhood is the first full month spent as a widow. See Holden (1989) and Burk-
hauser, Holden, and Myers (1986) for a discussion of the problems associated with
the accounting period during which a husband dies. Surveys (including SIPP) gen-
erally do not count the husband's income during the month of his death even
though he may have been present part of the month. This is probably the reason for
the lower income in month "0" and the rise in month" I" a more accurate measure
of the income the widow could draw on as a new widow.
8. The details ofthese plans are described in Chapter I.
9. Under this plan the computation period for the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings, which is used to compute benefit amounts, would be increased from 35 to
38 years and the move to age 67 as the earliest age of receipt for unreduced benefits
would be accelerated.
10. The 50 percent "survivor benefit" arises when both spouses receive equal
retired-worker benefits. In this case no additional benefits would be paid to the
survivor beyond his or her own retired-worker benefits.
11. Note the anomaly that a single worker gets less than the surviving spouse does
in a married couple.
12. Pensioners might have answered this question affirmatively if they had chosen
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a period-eertain option. Thus, the analysis is not strictly of the joint-and-survivor
selection. Nevertheless, any survivor selection indicates that the pensioner is willing
to forgo some share of his own pension in order to have it continue to his widow,
even if only in the case of his relatively early death and for a relatively short period of
widowhood.
13. ERISA did not mandate a survivor pension when pension vested workers died
prior to the earliest age of retirement. REA extended survivorship protection to
spouses of pre-retirement deceased workers. The NBS data are for retired men; thus
survivor pension receipt is not affected by the pre-retirement death provisions.
Tegen (1997), using data from the National Survey of Families and Households,
concludes that the REA did increase the percentage of widows receiving joint-and-
survivor pensions when husbands died prior to retirement.
14. This study used a sample of married men interviewed in the Retirement His-
tory Study and who died between the survey years 1969 and 1979. Their pension-
option selection was estimated by their widows' receipt of pension income that could
be attributed to their husbands' pension continuation.
15. The estimate of pension wealth is the actuarial value of the single-life option,
adjusting for the actual pension option selection of these men. While we know when
a survivor pension is chosen, we do not know what specific choice was made. We
assume a joint-and-one-half pension (the minimum allowed by ERISA) when esti-
mating the actuarial value of the pension of men who chose a survivor option.
16. Education-level variables were also included but statistically insignificant and
made little difference to the estimates. Education was hypothesized to influence the
information husbands sought when faced with the pension-option decision.
17. The effect of wife's marital history on the husband's pension-option selection
also was found to have no influence. The husband's marital history variable was
included in these estimates since the effect of a divorce on his assets and any obliga-
tions to a former wife are not observed while the assets the wife gained from a divorce
are observable and included in the WIDWLTH measure.
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